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REcENT CAsEs
certain that the verdict will represent the value of all interests in the
property. In borderline situations, such as the principal case, an-
other proceeding among the condemnees may be necessary to de-
termine the extent, if any, to which each is entitled to share in the
proceeds.
John T. Bondurant
MUNAMEAL CORPOBRAONS - CoNsimmoNAL LAW - LiABmrry OF
EMPLOYEES.- Defendant Erwin operated a fire truck as an employee
of the City of Mayfield. In response to a call to help fight a fire in
Murray, he was driving outside the corporate limits of Mayfield when
his truck and the vehicle of the plaintiff were involved in an ac-
cident. This action was brought against Erwin1 for his alleged neg-
ligence. The trial court dismissed the complaint, relying on Kentucky
Revised Statutes2 section 95.830(2), which provides in part: "Neither
the city nor its officers or employees shall be liable in any manner on
account of the use of the [fire] apparatus at any point outside of
the corporate limits of the city. . . ." An appeal was taken. Held:
Reversed, two judges dissenting. The statute freeing members of
city fire departments from personal liability for their negligent acts
is violative of two sections of the Kentucky Constitution: section 14,
which provides, "all courts shall be open, and every person for an
injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered with-
out sale, denial, or delay" and section 54, which provides, "the Gen-
eral Assembly shall have no power to limit the amount to be re-
covered for ... injuries to person or to property." Both of these sec-
tions were intended to preserve those jural rights which had become
well established prior to the adoption of the Constitution. Happy v.
Erwin, 330 S.W.2d 412 (Ky. 1959)
The statutory provision invalidated in the Happy case was evi-
dently part of the legislature's answer to Jefferson County Fiscal
Court v. Jefferson County,3 which declared that a city's contract to
furnish fire protection to the surrounding county was ultra vires and
void. KRS section 95.830, enacted the following year, furnished cities
with the power which had been shown to be lacking in the Jefferson
County case. It also contained the provision in question freeing fire-
1 The City of Mayfield, the City of Murray, and the liability insurance
carriers of the two cities were also defendants, but their positions are not relevant
here.
2 Hereinafter referred to as KRS.
3 278 Ky. 785, 129 S.W.2d 554, 122 A.L.R. 1151 (1939).
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men from liability for negligent acts outside the city. Because this
provision was not necessary to the fulfillment of the declared pur-
pose of the acte and because no similar provision exists concerning
the liability of firemen within a city, the writer doubts whether this
provision received as much consideration by the legislature as it
deserved.
It cannot be said, however, that the clause is without merit. That
firemen not be burdened by the threat of liability while attempting
to save the lives and homes of the populace could well be considered
of vital importance to the community. Furthermore, the provision
may have been included in an attempt to keep firemen's liability
insurance rates, and indirectly their salaries, as low as possible.
On the other hand, the ancient idea that the public should be
protected even at the expense of the individual, one of the arguments
offered traditionally in defense of sovereign immunity,5 will not sup-
port the present statute, which protects the individual fireman rather
than the public generally. Besides, the "ancient idea" of municipal
immunity is losing its popularity in the courts and in a few legis-
latures.6 Cities are now usually in a better position to provide com-
pensation for the injuries which they inflict than are the injured
parties. The careless acts of a city and its employees should not be
sanctioned, for this would promote greater carelessness. An in-
nocent individual should not be made to suffer while the municipality
or its firemen at fault remains unscathed.
The court suggests in the principal case that if the legislature were
allowed to grant immunity to firemen, there would be no reason why
it could not grant it to others, possibly even to private groups in
which the public is declared to have an interest. Although this argu-
ment may be conjectural, it is logically sound. Neither of the con-
stitutional provisions upon which the court relied contains any hint
that a distinction should be made between suits against public em-
ployees and suits against anyone else.
Pro and con policy arguments may be persuasive, but the legis-
lature made its policy known by the passage of the act, and its deci-
sion should stand unless in conflict with the Constitution. In con-
cluding that the provision was unconstitutional, the court relied on
two premises: (1) sections 14 and 54 prohibit the legislature from
denying individuals those jural rights which were well established
prior to the adoption of the Constitution, and (2) at common law
individuals had a right to recover damages from employees of munici-
4 See preamble to ch. 127 of the Ky. Acts of 1940 (H.B. 419).
5 23 Mich. L. Rev. 325, 837 (1925).6 Prosser, Torts 109, at 775 (2d ed. 1955).
7 330 S.W.2d at 414.
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palities who were negligent in the performance of governmental
functions. Abundant authority can be found in support of the second
premise.8 Therefore, the following discussion will relate solely to the
interpretation of sections 14 and 54.
A provision similar to section 14 is found in the bills of rights
of seventeen states.9 The court of Tennessee has limited the scope of
their section so that it is applied only to judicial and not legislative
action.10 Originally this was the view of Kentucky, but it has since
been abandoned.'" The problem of interpreting section 14 is min-
imized in Kentucky by a provision which complements the mean-
ing of the clause by making it applicable to legislation.12
The real problem presented by section 14 relates to a determin-
ation of what is "due course of law." Though the section has been
invoked as a guaranty of procedural rights,13 we are presently con-
cerned with substantive rights. As has already been indicated, the
Kentucky court has held that the provision was intended to per-
petuate jural rights which existed prior to the adoption of the Con-
stitution. Apparently the court would construe "jural rights" to in-
clude the right to pursue those remedies which the law "took cogniz-
ance of and furnished a remedy for"'4 at the time when the Con-
8 See, for example, Willet v. Hutchinson, 2 Root 85 (Conn. 1794) and Florio
v. Jersey City, 101 N.J.L. (16 Gummere) 585, 129 At. 470, 40 A.L.R. 1253
(1925).
9 Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Missis-
sippi, Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
Tennessee, West Virginia, and Utah. In Brown v. Wightman, 47 Utah 31, 151
Pac. 866 (1915), eleven other states were included in the list of those having
similar provisions, evidently using "similar" rather broadly.
10 Scott v. Nashville Bridge Co., 143 Tenn. (16 Thompson) 86, 223 S.W.
844 (1920). Cf. Adams v. Iten Biscuit Co., 63 Okla. 52, 162 Pac. 938 (1917).
"1Johnson v. Higgins, 60 Ky. (8 Met.) 566 (1861), laid down the rule
that § 14 limited the action of the courts, but did not restrict the legislature. Some
fifty years later, in Williams v. Wedding, 165 Ky. 361, 176 S.W. 1176 (1915),§ 2 and 14 were applied along with the fourteenth amendment to the federal
constitution to invalidate a legislative act. However, no mention of Johnson
v. Higgins was made in reaching this decision. Seventeen years later, in Ludwig
v. Johnson, 243 Ky. 533, 49 S.W.2d 347 (1932), the rule of Johnson v. Higgins
was at last recognized, but the court declined to follow it. It is interesting
to note that Johnson v. Higgins had withstood the constitutional revision of 1891.12 § 26 of the Kentucky Constitution, which provides that "everything in
this Bill of rights ... shall forever remain inviolate; and all laws contrary thereto
... shall be void" was interpreted as extending all limitations in the Bill of
Rights to legislative acts in Ludwig v. Johnson, 243 Ky. 533, 542, 49 S.W.2d
347, 351 (1932), noted in 23 Ky. L. J. 659 (1935).
13 Harbison v. George, 228 Ky. 168, 14 S.W.2d 405 (1929) (validity of fee
requirement for bringing an action); Gratzer v. Gertisen, 181 Ky. 626, 205
S.W. 782 (1918) (statutory limitation of right to appeal); Louisville & Nash-
ville R.R. Co. v. Greenbrier Distillery Co., 170 Ky. 775, 187 S.W. 296 (1916)
(statutory restriction of evidence to that presented in administrative proceed-
ing); and United Fuel & Gas Co. v. Commonwealth, 159 Ky. 34, 166 S.W. 783(1914) (necessity of writ of prohibition).14 Eastman v. Clackamas County, 32 Fed. 24, 32 (C.C.D.Ore. 1887), cited
with apparent approval in Ludwig v. Johnson, 243 Ky. 533, 541, 49 S.W.2d
347, 350-51 (1932).
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stitution was adopted. Whether or not these rights are limited to tort
actions is an open question, and inferences can be drawn from state-
ments of the court which would support arguments either way.15
Other interpretatoins have been applied by the courts of Del-
aware16 and Minnesota. 1'7 In Delaware the due course clause is said
to "secure the citizen against unreasonable and arbitrary deprivation
of rights" and to "[embrace] the principle of natural justice that ...
every man should have adequate legal remedy for injury done him
by another."'8 The test of existence of the remedy at common law,
though a relevant consideration, is not determinative, and cases
will instead turn on the definitions of the somewhat undefined terms
"rights" and "natural justice."
Minnesota also relates its due course clause to "general funda-
mental principles, founded in natural right and justice." However,
the courts of that state interpret the clause as a mere declaration
of inherent principles existing independently of the constitution and
look to those principles in reaching decisions instead of allowing the
provisions of the state bill of rights to form the bases of all rulings
concerning the rights of the individual.19
The view taken by Kentucky has been criticized as being too
inflexible. It allows injustice which was condoned by the common
law to continue to be condoned. Yet, because the law at the time
of the adoption of the Constitution is determinable, the Kentucky
rule provides the courts and legislatures with a standard that can
be applied with relative ease and certainty. On the other hand, Del-
aware and Minnesota allow each judge a free hand in determining
whether the plaintiff has adequate remedy for injury done him by
another. In order to overcome the objection of inflexibility, and at
the same time maintain a maximum amount of certainty, a synthesis
of the Kentucky and Delaware views is suggested: remedies which
had become well established at the time of the adoption of the Con-
stitution will be preserved unless such remedies are clearly and
grievously inequitable or unsuitable.
The court in the present case also relied on section 54 to support
the proposition that remedies which existed at common law may not
'5 Eastman v. Clackamas County, supra note 14, cited with apparent approval
in Ludwig v. Johnson, supra note 12, contains an implication that § 14 would
perpetuate the common law action on a debt. On the other hand, wording of
the Kentucky court in Ludwig v. Johnson, 243 Ky. 533, 543, 49 S.W.2d 347,
351 (1932) indicates that the only action perpetuated is one concerning negli-
gence.
16 Gallegher v. Davis, 37 Del. 380, 183 AUt. 620 (1936).
' Allen v. Pioneer Press Co., 40 Minn. 117, 41 N.W. 936 (1889).
'S Gallagher v. Davis, 37 Del. 380, 183 At. 620, 624 (1936).
19 Allen v. Pioneer Press Co., 40 Minn. 117, 41 N.W. 936, 938 (1889).
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be extinguished by the legislature. This section prohibits the General
Assembly from limiting the amount to be recovered for injuries.
It has been argued that while the legislature may not limit the amount
of recovery in an action, it may nevertheless completely deny a right
to bring suit.20 The fallacy of this argument is obvious. A complete
denial is certainly nothing less than an infinitive limitation. The
latter is the position taken by the Kentucky court.21
But what remedies does Section 54 preserve? This question has
rarely been answered outside Kentucky. In those states which have
interpreted similar constitutional provisions it has been said that
the legislature may not place limits upon the amount of damages for
injuries recoverable at law22 or at common law.23 The former is rather
vague, and may have been intended to be a short-hand statement
of the latter. At any rate it is clear that the provision was intended
to prohibit the legislature from limiting recovery for some type of
injury. It is submitted that the standard based on remedies which
existed at common law is reasonable and is consonant with the
apparent intent of the authors of the various constitutions.
Problems which the Kentucky interpretation of section 14 left
unanswered are similarly left unanswered as they relate to section
54. Thus, whether the rule will be applied inflexibly, and whether
it will be applied to, for example, the right to sue on a contract re-
main matters of conjecture.
In conclusion, the writer feels that the result reached in the
principle case was found,24 and that the rules relied upon, so far
as they went, are reasonable. It is believed that the statute in ques-
tion was undesirable as a matter of policy, and that it was properly
held unconstitutional. The only criticism which can be leveled against
the decision is its failure, perhaps intentional, to fully set the bounds
within which sections 14 and 54 will apply.
Burke B. Terrell
20 Ludwig v. Johnson, supra note 12.
21 Ibid: also see Kentucky State Journal Co. v. Workmen's Compensation
Bd., 161 Ky. 562, 170 S.W. 437 (1914).2 See Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 263 Pa. 158, 106 Atl. 238 (1919).
23 See Industrial Commission v. Frohmiller, 60 Ariz. 464, 140 P. 2d 219
(1943).24heference must be made to McDermott v. Irwin, 148 Ohio 67, 73 N.E.2d
86 (1947), in which the court ruled that in a similar fact situation no debatable
constitutional issue was presented. Although Ohio has a constitutional provi-
sion almost identical to 14 of Kentucky, no mention was made of it in the
opinion, and there is no way to know if it was even considered.
